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<a>INTRODUCTION 
Other chapters of this Handbook show that environmental taxes are very interesting 
instruments for environmental regulation. The question addressed in this chapter is 
whether they are still interesting when the environmental problem is a global one. Are 
they still effective and efficient? Are they feasible and acceptable? First, however, a 
few definitions are needed: what are global environmental problems and how could 
taxes help address them? 
A global environmental problem is an environmental problem to which nearly 
all countries contribute and that affects nearly all countries of the world. This implies 
that nearly all countries should participate in resolving it. However, individual 
countries contribute in different amounts and are affected in different ways. They also 
face different abatement costs, or costs for reducing their share of environmental 
harm. This implies that national contributions toward resolving the problem should be 
modulated. Clearly, making sure that all countries participate and allocating 
abatement efforts efficiently across all countries will be key issues for global 
environmental problems, particularly as there exists no global authority that could 
force participation and impose abatement efforts on sovereign countries (Carraro 
1999). 
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The main global environmental problems are climate change, ozone depletion 
and biodiversity loss.1 The atmosphere and the oceans, with their absorptive capacity 
and the species they host, and even outer space with the room it offers, are common 
property resources of humanity. Everyone who uses such a resource reduces others’ 
ability to use it. No one can prevent or regulate this in the absence of enforceable 
property rights. 
Ozone depletion has been combated quite successfully through treaties banning 
dangerous substances. The success of this approach has been attributed to the 
possibility of rapidly replacing the chemicals. Similar bans on greenhouse gases are 
obviously much less feasible. Therefore, a more gradual approach is advocated for 
climate policy, one that leaves much more freedom to individual emitters about how 
and when they reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases and which gases they abate 
primarily. The international approach relies mainly on voluntary measures such as 
information, persuasion (see Baranzini and Thalmann 2004), technology transfer, and 
bilateral mitigation projects (clean development mechanism, joint implementation) 
that generate 'credits' to be used against some mitigation obligation or objective. The 
main internationally coordinated action is the European Union's Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS), a cap-and-trade system for large carbon dioxide emitters. In 
                                                     
1 The depletion of mineral resources could be added to this list, with some 
precautions. Indeed, contrary to the atmosphere and the oceans, ownership 
rights are often well defined for mineral resources (but not always, viz. deep 
ocean resources). However, their owners may overexploit them, at the expense 
of future generations of the world population. Their depletion at an inefficient 
rate is similar to the depletion of natural resources without ownership. 
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addition, nearly all countries have implemented some climate policy, drawing on a 
mix of these instruments, augmented with regulation, subsidies and taxes. 
Based on the experience with domestic carbon taxes and economists' long-
standing promotion of this instrument, the question of whether that potentially very 
effective and efficient instrument could also be used at the international level 
naturally arises, particularly as its environmental- and cost-effectiveness could 
grandly be augmented by international coordination. 
Since climate policy is the area in which a global environmental tax has received 
the greatest attention by the political and scientific community, this chapter 
concentrates on the carbon tax. However, the assessment of the global carbon tax can 
easily be carried over to other global environmental taxes. A good part of the 
assessment of the global carbon tax also extends to a broader approach, that of global 
carbon pricing (advocated by the OECD, among others (OECD 2009, Chapter 4)), 
which includes reductions in subsidies to fossil fuels and a market for carbon dioxide 
emission certificates. 
<a>THE DESIGN OF A GLOBAL CARBON TAX 
Two possible formats for a global carbon tax have been discussed extensively: 
harmonized taxes and an international tax (Hoel 1992). In the first, a set of countries 
agree to raise their carbon prices. They might agree on the same tax rate or on 
different rates in different countries, for instance lower rates in less developed 
countries. The rates could be set with a quantity objective or at a level corresponding 
to external costs. Tax revenues accrue to each country but a part could be put into a 
common fund and used for international transfers. 
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With the international tax design, each country is taxed on its national 
emissions,2 and each has to pay into a common fund an amount that is proportional to 
its total CO2 emissions. At the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere of 
1988, the creation of a World Atmospheric Fund was recommended. Under that 
proposal, the revenues are returned to the participating countries in fixed shares. Each 
country is free to decide how it finances its net contribution to the common fund, 
whether by a domestic carbon tax or by any other means. 
Apart from these overarching schemes, one can imagine all sorts of 
combinations of national carbon taxes with other instruments that would create 
international links. For instance, firms could be exempted from the domestic carbon 
tax if they deliver foreign ETS permits for their emissions.3 OECD (2009, 120) even 
envisages the reverse option, namely that a firm could avoid buying domestic ETS 
permits by paying the carbon tax enforced in a foreign country. In that case, the 
foreign carbon tax would place a lid on domestic permit prices. Alternatively, a 
country with an emissions-reduction target could use a domestic carbon tax to try to 
                                                     
2 Whalley and Wiggle (1991a, 1991b) estimated the effects of a variant where 
the carbon tax is collected on a production basis. In that case, large producers of 
fossil fuels such as the OPEC countries and Russia would collect the highest tax 
revenues or contribute most into the common fund. Absent compensating 
redistribution of the revenues, there is of course an enormous difference 
between harmonized taxes on carbon extraction and those on CO2 emissions. 
3 Such a model is in preparation in Switzerland, where large CO2 emitters could 
buy permits on the European ETS, of which Switzerland is not a member. In 
practice, Swiss and EU permits would become fungible, at least for Swiss firms. 
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meet it and could plan to buy foreign permits if the tax turned out to be too low. It 
could even try to sell its own permits abroad if domestic mitigation overshot the 
target, provided of course that other countries accepted its permits. Such mechanisms 
lead to some international harmonization of carbon prices and transfers of funds. 
In the following sections, we will assess the two 'pure' global tax schemes: 
harmonized taxes and an international tax. 
<a>ASSESSMENT OF THE GLOBAL CARBON TAX 
The first question to ask is: what are the criteria for assessment? The standard criteria 
for an environmental policy instrument are its target effectiveness (does it achieve its 
goal, such as a desired environmental improvement or a target revenue), cost-
effectiveness (does it achieve that goal at minimum resource costs), practical 
feasibility (legal conditions, administrative and compliance costs), fairness (is the 
burden fairly shared), and, finally, acceptability. 
The assessment of the global carbon tax in this chapter will emphasize the 
international dimensions, i.e. its effectiveness in meeting a global environmental or 
income target, its ability to allocate efforts across countries in a manner that 
minimizes total costs of meeting that target, and the way it shares the burden among 
countries. 
The assessment criteria are not independent. Participation is more likely if 
countries perceive an agreement to be fair. Wide participation is necessary for target- 
and cost-effectiveness. Feasibility constraints may reduce effectiveness. 
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The global carbon tax can be assessed on its own, i.e. in comparison with no 
international policy, or in comparison with other instruments designed to achieve the 
same environmental or revenue goal, such as tradable emission quotas.4 
<a>ENVIRONMENTAL-EFFECTIVENESS AND PARTICIPATION 
An incentive tax can, in theory, be designed to meet any environmental target. Its 
effectiveness is reduced, however, when it is set at a low rate or when important 
sources are exempted for political reasons (Ekins and Speck 1999). In the case of a 
global environmental tax, effectiveness is threatened by nonparticipation of countries 
that are large emitters. Consider for instance CO2 emitted by the consumption and 
flaring of fossil fuels. China and the United States together account for 41 percent of 
world emissions of this type. Ten countries account for two thirds of world emissions 
(Figure 25.1). Clearly, an agreement among these ten would have the potential to 
lower world CO2 emissions substantially. Note that three of them—China, India and 
Iran—are not in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol, the list of countries with an 
emissions-reduction target. The European Union accounts for about 12 percent of 
world emissions. 
 [Insert Figure 25.1 about here] 
A global environmental tax will be effective only if at least the main emitters 
participate, and they must participate voluntarily as there is no world authority to 
                                                     
4 For comparisons between a global carbon tax and a system of tradable quotas, 
see for example Cooper (2000), Green, Hayward and Hassett (2007) McKibbin, 
Morris and Wilcoxen (2009) and Nordhaus (2007), who all conclude in favor of 
the tax, and Wiener (1999), who concludes in favor of quotas. 
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impose participation. This concerns not only current large emitters but also future 
ones. Jacoby, Prinn and Schmalensee (1998) argue that even if all industrialized 
countries listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol reduced their net greenhouse gas 
emissions to zero by the end of this century, that would have only a small impact on 
the climate, due to rapid emissions growth in the developing world. Still, the lowest-
income countries might be given time for economic growth before they take over 
mitigation objectives. Nordhaus (2006) suggests a threshold for participation of 
US$10,000 per capita. 
Nonparticipating countries ('pollution havens') could use the resulting 
competitive advantage to increase their world market shares and possibly even attract 
some production facilities from participating countries. As a result, global emissions 
would decrease less than those of the participating countries, a phenomenon known as 
carbon leakage. There exists a sizable empirical literature on the magnitude of carbon 
leakage, as this argument is often advanced against unilateral climate policy (OECD 
2009, Chapter 3). Reinaud (2009) shows that phase I of the EU ETS did not lead to 
any significant leakage, even for particularly carbon-intensive sectors exposed to 
international competition, contrary to the pessimistic forecasts of simulation studies. 
However, the author acknowledges that the generous distribution of emission 
certificates did not impose much of a burden and that it might be too early to draw 
conclusions. Nevertheless, this confirms the results of earlier studies that showed that 
environmental regulation was not as important a determinant of the location of 
production as labor costs, taxes, or exchange rate and political risks (Cropper and 
Oates 1992; OECD 1993). Even so, the European Commission drafted a controversial 
list of sectors exposed to serious risk of carbon leakage under full auctioning of ETS 
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permits that includes nearly one half of all sectors, accounting for three quarters of 
greenhouse gas emissions covered by the EU ETS. 
Gaining a competitive advantage by not participating versus running the risk of 
losing market share by participating are strong incentives for free-riding. Hence the 
call for accompanying measures, mainly in the form of border adjustments: a country 
that imposes the carbon tax would reimburse it to its exporters and charge it on 
imports from nonparticipating countries. Obviously, measuring the contents of 
untaxed carbon in each imported product would be extremely difficult, but the 
number of carbon-intensive goods is not that large, so limiting the adjustments to 
these goods would yield a feasible and satisfactory solution (Goulder 1992). This 
measure, however, looks very similar to protectionist measures that are banned by 
WTO rules, which suggests that it must be drafted very carefully (Holzer 2010). 
Another solution is to start with a non-uniform domestic tax that imposes a higher rate 
on goods subject to less international competition (Hoel 1996). 
Carbon leakage is not the only deterrent against participation in a global carbon 
tax scheme. Each country also weighs the burden the tax represents against the 
expected benefits. When the revenues of the tax are recycled in the country, its burden 
is equal, as a first approximation, to abatement costs. It is less, in fact, due to the 
ancillary domestic benefits of carbon mitigation (such as less damage due to air 
pollution, and terms-of-trade gains on fossil fuels imports), and even less if the 
revenues are well recycled ('second dividend'). Still, there could remain a net burden 
of the carbon tax, which might or might not be offset by the expected benefits of 
climate change mitigation. Indeed, countries will be affected quite differently by 
climate change. Some might even gain, although this is increasingly doubted. Still, 
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some countries might make this argument in order to stay out of conjoint abatement 
efforts. 
Even if environmental benefits exceed total net burdens in the world aggregate 
when the mitigation target is well set (Stern 2007), that may not be the case for each 
individual country. It is generally admitted that participation in a global carbon tax 
scheme, and in efficient global climate mitigation as a general matter, would be 
particularly burdensome for developing countries. OECD (2009, 59) attributes this to 
the 'higher carbon-intensity of their economies.' On the other hand, developing 
countries are also expected to gain the most from avoided climate change because of 
their greater exposure. Nevertheless, with their great difficulties in addressing the 
current needs of their populations, developing countries generally attach less priority 
to preserving the environment and discount the future at much higher rates than 
developed countries do, which is understandable if they expect stronger consumption 
growth rates than the latter (Dasgupta, Mäler and Barrett 1999). For both reasons the 
balance of carbon abatement costs and benefits is strongly tilted toward the costs side. 
The fact that total abatement costs will be inferior to the cost of no action when 
the target is appropriately set implies that climate mitigation generates a global 
'surplus' potentially sufficient to compensate countries for which abatement costs 
exceed benefits. This potential compensation may well have to become real to make 
at least all major emitters participate. The UNFCC (Article 11) provides for such a 
financial mechanism, which is operated by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
created in 1990. Remember, however, that the benefits from mitigation will accrue in 
the distant future in the form of avoided damages, not an easy source of funds for 
compensatory payments today! Alternatively, the global carbon tax might be part of a 
wider international environmental agreement, which might provide for different forms 
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of conditional side-payments, technology transfer, trade sanctions and so forth (for a 
survey, see Wagner 2001). 
If redistribution of funds is a condition for participation, some of the revenues of 
the harmonized national taxes would have to be put into a common pool. The 
international tax would automatically direct huge revenues into the common pool if 
the tax is designed to induce significant mitigation. Most of those revenues would be 
contributed by the richer countries. It is, however, doubtful that these countries would 
participate and entrust huge funds to an international body.5 Neither is it clear that 
their electorates would support large payments to countries where they might raise 
governance issues (OECD 2009, 59). 
These concerns could be addressed by imposing the international tax above 
some national quota of tax-free emissions, i.e. participating countries would pay only 
the tax on emissions exceeding their quota. If the quota were too generous, exceeding 
the level of emissions the country would choose in the face of the tax, the tax would 
be entirely ineffective. It would be effective if it could turn into a subsidy for 
countries that emitted less than their quota. This is illustrated in Figure 25.2. The 
high-income country optimally decides to abate the amount A* of its CO2 emissions 
under the tax, because beyond A* the marginal cost of the additional abated ton 
would cost more than paying the tax. Therefore, its residual emissions are equal to E0 
A*, E0 being total emissions without any abatement, or the maximum abatement 
volume. With a regular carbon tax, this country would have to pay an amount equal to 
the surface of the rectangle of which one side is the segment E0 A* and the other is 
                                                     
5 Schelling (1991, 215) had estimated the contribution of the United States at 
some US$100 billion per year, a figure that is confirmed below. 
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equal to the tax rate. With a quota of free emissions Ef, the country effectively only 
pays the tax on its excess emissions, or E0 Ef A*. The amount of that tax corresponds 
to the darkened rectangle. With the same reasoning, the low-income country, which 
emits little and has low marginal abatement costs and a generous quota, chooses 
residual emissions below its quota. It is rewarded by the amount represented by the 
darkened rectangle. Under this scheme, both high- and low-income countries have the 
same incentive for mitigation: the amount that the former pays into the common fund 
are limited, and the latter is clearly rewarded for its efforts by an amount that covers a 
good part of its abatement costs (the surface under the MAC curve). 
 [Insert Figure 25.2 about here] 
In spite of its attractive features, this solution does not simplify the negotiation 
process. It is still necessary to agree on the tax-free quota for each participating 
country. On the other hand, the international tax design leaves each nation its 
sovereignty over how it finances its contribution to the common fund, infringing 
much less on the delicate matter of tax systems than does the harmonized tax 
scheme.6 
<a>REVENUE-EFFECTIVENESS 
That its revenues can be used for compensation payments is of course the attractive 
feature of a global tax, compared to tradable quotas allocated for free. The amounts 
involved are potentially huge. Not surprisingly, some have proposed to reverse the 
perspective: to raise a global environmental tax for its revenue potential, the 
                                                     
6 Loss of tax sovereignty was the killer argument against the European project 
of a centralized mixed carbon and energy tax, particularly as unanimity was 
required for its adoption (Zhang and Baranzini 2004). 
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environmental improvement being the welcome side-effect. A revenue target would 
be set and the effectiveness of a global environmental tax in meeting this target would 
take the place of environmental-effectiveness as the main purpose. This would have 
the practical implication that the tax rate would be set not to attain a mitigation target 
or to internalize external costs but to raise a desired amount of revenue. 
Many different revenue targets have been proposed for global environmental 
taxes, with corresponding hypothecation of the tax revenues. Earmarking of revenues 
is fundamentally a constraint on spending that ought to be avoided, but it is often 
necessary in order to make a tax acceptable. This seems to be particularly the case for 
global environmental taxes. The international community seems more likely to accept 
such taxes if their revenues are earmarked for international spending, especially 
spending related to the nature of the taxes. Such earmarking of the revenues may also 
be needed when the main purpose of the global tax remains environmental-
effectiveness. 
Thus, it has been proposed to dedicate the revenues of carbon taxation to 
international development funding (Atkinson 2004), with the argument that climate 
change threatens the economic growth of the poorest countries, both through the 
burdens of mitigation and adaptation and the remaining impacts of climate change 
(Sandmo 2004). The World Bank estimates annual mitigation costs in developing 
countries between US$140 billion and $175 billion by 2030, but since this requires 
mostly up-front investments, the financing needs in the early years are two to three 
times larger. To that must be added some US$30 billion to $100 billion every year for 
adaptation, which would not avoid all damages (World Bank 2010, 259–60). In the 
Copenhagen Accord and reinforced at the 16th Conference of Parties in Cancun in 
December 2010, the developed countries committed to mobilizing jointly US$100 
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billion per year by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries. 
A 'Green Climate Fund' is to be created, but there is no agreement yet on how the 
money would be raised. There exists already a 2 percent tax on certified emission 
reductions created through the clean development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Its revenues feed the Adaptation Fund and could reach between US$1 billion and $2 
billion in 2020 depending on the restrictions imposed on the purchase of credits 
(Fankhauser and Martin 2010).7 
What would the revenue effectiveness of a global carbon tax be? Worldwide 
CO2 emissions from energy consumption amount to some 30 billion tons, of which 
about 15 billion tons come from high-income countries (US Energy Information 
Administration, International Energy Statistics). Thus, every dollar of tax per ton of 
CO2 emissions in high-income countries would generate US$15 billion in revenues 
for the global fund. The middle range of the estimates of mitigation and adaptation 
costs in developing countries presented above, about US$220 billion, could be 
financed by a tax of US$15 per ton CO2 in high-income countries.8 
                                                     
7 As of January 31, 2011, the Adaptation Fund, which was established in 2011 
but really began operations after 2008, had received US$138 million from the 
CER tax and US$86 million from donors and other sources 
(AFB/EFC.4/10/rev.2). 
8 These estimates assume full compliance and they ignore the incentive effect 
of the tax. CO2 emissions can be estimated to decrease by some 10 percent in 
developed economies for a tax of US$15 (Bicchetti et al. 2007, 25). We express 
all tax rates per ton CO2. They can be converted into tax rates per ton carbon by 
multiplying them by 3.66. 
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Such back-of-the-envelope calculations ignore the incidence of the tax on its tax 
base. Revenue effectiveness is controversial for environmental taxes precisely 
because those taxes are initially designed to discourage a polluting activity, which is 
their own tax base. Of course, the kinds of global taxes considered in this chapter are 
not designed to eliminate the polluting activity entirely, but the tax base erosion effect 
ought to be taken into account. This is done in simulations with computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2010) start from different 
estimates of climate change impacts and adaptation costs in the literature. They retain 
climate change impacts of US$223 billion in 2040 for developing countries, or about 
1 percent of their GDP. Financial compensation could be funded with a global tax of 
US$6.80 per ton CO2 if all countries participated, or US$20 if participation were 
restricted to OECD countries. In the first case, world CO2 emissions would decline as 
a side effect by 19 percent and in the second case by only 3.6 percent relative to 
baseline.9 As a matter of fact, the tax restricted to OECD countries has CO2 emissions 
growing by 2 percent relative to baseline in non-OECD countries due to lower 
demand for fossil fuels in the OECD, resulting in lower prices, and to some relocation 
of industrial production. The details of the simulation show the difficulties a tax 
restricted to the OECD will have in paying for worldwide climate change impacts. It 
would impose welfare losses on Australia, New Zealand and Canada equivalent to 
close to 2 percent of their total household consumption and it would imply annual 
                                                     
9 The revenues are paid lump-sum to the populations of the affected countries in 
proportion to their costs of climate change. This has only a marginal impact on 
emissions reduction. Emissions reduction is obtained by the incentive effect of 
the tax. 
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transfers of about US$100 billion from the United States mainly to India and other 
emerging countries in Asia aside from China. These economic impacts can be divided 
approximately by five if the global carbon tax is designed to cover adaptation costs in 
developing countries instead of their costs from climate change. 
Financing adaption in developing countries is also the aim of the Swiss proposal 
to the Conference of Parties to the UNFCC: an international carbon tax of US$2 per 
ton CO2 with a basic tax exemption of 1.5 ton of CO2 per capita. Its estimated annual 
revenues of about US$18 billion would go into the Adaptation Fund.10 This proposal 
beats other proposals that make the tax rate depend on the income level of each 
country in that it maintains the cost-effectiveness of climate mitigation (see below). 
Another reference for financing needs is that of the additional resources required 
to reach the Millennium Development Goals, estimated at around US$50 billion per 
year on top of the US$57 billion provided currently under official development 
assistance, or ODA (Atkinson 2004). The fact that the revenues of the CO2 tax would 
have to come on top of existing ODA hints at an important threat to this proposal: 
                                                     
10 In the preparation of this proposal, Bicchetti et al. (2007) simulated an 
international carbon tax that would be sufficient to finance adaptation needs in 
the developing countries, estimating it at about US$10 billion in 2010 and rising 
to US$45 billion by 2040. The required tax would start at US$1 per ton CO2 in 
2010 and rise to US$4 in 2040. If the tax were restricted to OECD countries, it 
would have to start at US$3 and rise to US$13. In this case, world CO2 
emissions would decrease by less than 1 percent, whereas the worldwide tax 
generating the same revenues would obtain a decrease in CO2 emissions by 6 
percent in 2040. 
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countries might see their carbon-based contribution to the global fund as a substitute 
for their existing ODA and lower it (Sandmo 2004). The fact that the carbon tax 
would crowd out domestic tax revenues by eroding their tax base adds to the 
likelihood of such considerations. 
<a>COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
When several sources contribute to a common pool of pollution and each has the 
ability to lower its emissions, it seems to be desirable that those sources that can lower 
their emissions at the smallest cost provide the greatest reductions. This minimizes the 
total cost for a target amount of emissions reduction or, equivalently, allows the 
greatest reduction for the same budget. This will be discussed on a theoretical level 
before addressing the challenges of implementation. 
For well-defined marginal abatement costs (MAC), total abatement cost is 
minimized when each source abates to the point where its MAC is equal to that of all 
other sources. So long as MACs are different, total cost can be lowered for the same 
mitigation result by having a source with lower MACs abate a little bit more and 
letting a source with higher MAC abate correspondingly less. 
Of course, it is extremely difficult to estimate a national MAC, let alone a global 
MAC. Indeed, doing so would involve ranking all possible measures available to 
abate emissions, from the cheapest to the dearest. For simulation purposes, this is 
done by examining each measure individually (often a technology or a type of 
resource substitution), estimating the cost of abating different quantities of emissions 
with each measure (its MAC), and then constructing the outer envelope of these 
MACs, which defines the mix of measures that minimizes costs for each desired level 
of abatement. Setting a common mitigation target for several countries increases the 
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portfolio of possible mitigation measures, which generally lowers the costs of 
reaching that target. Estimating MAC is necessary for setting optimal targets, based 
on a comparison of mitigation costs and benefits. The beauty of economic instruments 
such as environmental taxes is that they do not require any centralized knowledge of 
MAC. Indeed, they confront emitters with a common price for emissions, which 
induces each to compare her own mitigation options (i.e. MAC) with that price, 
thereby comparing them indirectly with the mitigation options of all other emitters 
facing the same price.  
Equalization of MAC could be obtained by regulation if some authority were 
able and allowed to impose upon each source that amount of abatement that equates 
all MACs. It can be obtained much more easily by making sources pay a unit price for 
their emissions. Sources minimize their total cost—abatement plus tax on residual 
emissions —by selecting the quantity of abatement that equates their MAC to the unit 
price. Since that price is the same for all sources, all MACs are equated and least-cost 
mitigation obtains. 
The uniform carbon price has the further attractive feature of rewarding 
continuous improvement. Indeed, as sources pay on residual emissions, contrary to 
regulation, they have an incentive to find new ways to reduce their emissions. This 
promotes the development, diffusion and adoption of innovation. Cost minimization 
at any point in time is called 'static cost-effectiveness,' while the pressure to improve 
continuously leads to 'dynamic cost-effectiveness.' 
Transposed to a global environmental problem like CO2 emissions, this suggests 
that global mitigation cost minimization can be enforced with a uniform carbon price. 
Every source of CO2 emissions in the world should be charged the same price for 
each ton of CO2 it emits (more precisely, for each quantity of greenhouse gases that 
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has a warming potential equal to that of a ton of CO2). If a global carbon tax allows 
the achievement of this, then it can be considered as efficient.11 Any deviation from a 
uniform global carbon price would imply inefficient mitigation. 
Full tax harmonization naturally obtains a uniform carbon price for all sources. 
In the case of the international tax, where countries are charged proportionally to their 
CO2 emissions, a uniform carbon price for all sources obtains only if each country 
passes those costs down to all domestic sources. That means that in each country each 
source is made to contribute to the national bill in proportion to its contribution to 
national emissions. This amounts, in effect, to each country’s introducing a domestic 
carbon tax at a rate equal to the international tax, which ends up being the same as tax 
harmonization. 
The global costs of mitigation can be lowered substantially by its efficient 
division among all countries. Early simulations with four world models found cost 
savings in the range of 30 to 40 percent compared to a case where each country abates 
by itself (Weyant 1993). Later simulations with 13 improved integrated assessment 
models found even greater cost savings. Just allowing for the efficient apportionment 
of mitigation across the Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol lowers the required 
carbon tax by half compared to the tax if each country meets its target on its own 
(Weyant and Hill 1999). If developing countries are included, the required world tax, 
which measures the burden of mitigation indirectly because it is the common MAC, is 
                                                     
11 The uniform carbon price could also be achieved, in theory, by subsidizing 
emitters for emissions reduction or by forcing them to acquire emission permits 
on an efficient (i.e. single-price) market, provided the subsidy or the price of 
permits were the same worldwide. 
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four to nine times smaller than the stand-alone US tax for instance, depending on the 
model used (ibid.). The required carbon tax can be further reduced by 15 to 55 percent 
by including noncarbon greenhouse gases (Weyant, de la Chesnaye and Blanford 
2006). 
The substantial cost savings derived from including all countries in the global 
mitigation effort arise from the fact that developed countries are 'locked' in carbon-
intensive infrastructures such as power plants, which cannot be replaced rapidly at 
low cost, whereas developing countries could follow a low-carbon growth path. 
However, these estimates do not account for many practical issues and market 
imperfections that stand in the way of cost-efficient sharing of the mitigation burden 
(Kolstad and Toman 2005). 
There are many reasons to revise this ideal picture of the global carbon tax, even 
aside from its feasibility.12 The first is related to fixed costs, which the comparison of 
MACs ignores. Forcing many small sources to reduce their emissions when each 
faces a fixed cost to start doing so may end up costing more than forcing large sources 
with possibly higher MACs to mitigate more. It could even cost more than the 
damage avoided. Administrative and compliance costs contribute to fixed costs. If 
                                                     
12 Baumol and Bradford (1970) show that optimal taxation of externalities 
differs from the internalization of those externalities under a budget constraint. 
Baumol and Oates (1988, Chapter 7), show further real-world interferences with 
the first-best ideal of equal MACs. In particular, the local (marginal) 
comparison of gains in abatement costs when they are reallocated between 
sources may not be representative of the global comparison of the actual 
production patterns with the social optimum. 
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these costs vary by source, they should be taken into account in the comparison of 
MACs.13 The ideal picture also breaks down when large or numerous small sources 
do not minimize their total costs—abatement plus tax. One can imagine many 
situations where they would not: nonoptimizing behavior, imperfect information, split 
incentives (whoever decides is not the one who pays, for instance in rental housing), 
market power, or subsidies (including public or semipublic enterprises).14 
Further problems with the ideal picture appear at the international level. The 
model assumes that abatement costs can be compared worldwide, as though there 
existed a single world market with a single world price for the resources needed for 
abatement. That might be true for commodities such as oil and gas, which are traded 
worldwide, but not for less mobile resources such as physical capital and labor. 
Barriers to trade and the diffusion of technologies and know-how jeopardize static and 
                                                     
13 OECD (2009) cites deforestation and methane emissions resulting from 
pipeline leakage as sources with high monitoring and enforcement costs. 
14 OECD (2009, 100) estimates that 'removing environmentally harmful fossil 
fuel energy subsidies, especially in non-OECD countries is an important first 
step. This would reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions drastically in the 
subsidized countries, in some cases by over 30 percent relative to business-as-
usual (BAU) levels by 2050 and it would also raise GDP per capita in most of 
the countries concerned. A multilateral removal of energy subsidies would cut 
GHG emissions globally by 10 percent by 2050 relative to BAU and this cut 
could be increased if developed countries adopt binding emission caps. The 
removal of energy subsidies would lower the cost of achieving a given 
mitigation target.' 
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dynamic cost-effectiveness. Suppose it took one man-hour to abate one ton of CO2 in 
the United States and two man-hours to do it in China. Should one conclude that more 
mitigation ought to be performed in the United States? United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (1972) and Dasgupta (1972) recommend using domestic 
shadow prices, reflecting opportunity costs in terms of foregone domestic 
consumption, to assess projects. 
Even if abatement costs were perfectly comparable across countries, it is not 
obvious that the kind of total abatement cost minimization that a uniform tax would 
bring corresponds to a welfare optimum (Chichilnisky and Heal 1994; Chichilnisky 
1994; Hourcade, Helioui and Gilotte 1997). If any country were to set its carbon tax 
in autarky, it would compare the marginal cost of mitigation, in terms of foregone 
consumption utility for its population, with the marginal benefits of smaller (future) 
climate change. Every one of these determinants of the optimal domestic carbon tax 
differs between countries. In low-income countries, the balance tilts strongly on the 
side of mitigation costs, so they would select a much lower tax than would high-
income countries.15 A uniform world carbon tax would be too high for low-income 
countries and too low for high-income countries. It seems that the only way to agree 
on the total abatement cost minimization solution of the uniform tax is to transfer 
revenue from high- to low-income countries. The transfers would not need to equate 
income levels but they would need to compensate for the differentials in burdens 
imposed by the cost-minimizing solution. Absent such transfers, a solution with 
differentiated carbon taxes is closer to a second-best option (Sandmo 2004). 
                                                     
15 This argument is equivalent to the personalized Lindahl contributions to the 
costs of a public good (Hinchy and Fisher 1999). 
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A further complication derives from the fact that the greenhouse effect is not the 
only motive for taxing fossil fuels. Their burning generally causes local damage, 
mainly through air pollution. In addition, many countries tax fuels for revenue 
purposes, whether because they cannot impose less distorting taxes or because they 
want to link payment to the use of public goods (such as a tax on gasoline and diesel 
to pay for roads). With preexisting fuel taxes, a uniform carbon tax such as the 
harmonized carbon tax does not equate marginal abatement costs (Haugland, Olsen 
and Roland 1992). Hoel (1993a) has shown how the other motives ought to be taken 
into account in determining the optimal national taxes on fossil fuels. As a result, the 
full optimal taxes on fossil fuels are quite different from country to country, even 
when the part that corresponds to the greenhouse effect, the carbon tax, is 
harmonized. It is not even the case that the harmonized carbon tax should simply be 
added on top of the preexisting taxes, because the higher tax reduces emissions, 
moving the country down the marginal damage curve for local pollution, and 
increases the deadweight loss. It is therefore quite defendable to lower preexisting 
fuel taxes when introducing the carbon tax. Of course, it is extremely hard to 
distinguish that adjustment from a country’s compensating reductions because it 
would rather free-ride on other countries' carbon mitigation than pass the full cost of 
the carbon tax onto its citizens. 
The design with the international tax is not exempt from similar problems. 
Indeed, it determines only how much each participating country must contribute to the 
common fund in proportion to its emissions, not how it finances this contribution. It 
might for instance exempt its trade-exposed sectors and impose taxes more heavily on 
the emissions of sheltered sectors. That would destroy both gains from trade and cost-
effective mitigation. Although this is a clear breach of trade principles, it remains that 
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it is not necessarily optimal for a country to impose a uniform tax on all its emissions 
sources equal to the international tax, for the same reasons that the harmonized carbon 
tax does not imply equal optimal domestic taxes on fossil fuels (Hoel 1993b). 
<a>FAIRNESS 
Focusing on environmental- and cost-effectiveness is acceptable for small national 
environmental taxes because other social mechanisms or the potential redistribution of 
the net gains from the policy can be invoked to address their burden on low-income 
households. Such an argument is much harder to defend at the international level, 
where the disparity in incomes is even greater and where there are very few 
redistributive mechanisms (Wiener 1999). On the other hand, actual redistribution and 
compensation is much more likely with a global tax because countries must be made 
to participate voluntarily. 
It is necessary to consider three elements in assessing the fairness of a global 
environmental tax: (1) the direct economic burden for each country, (2) the revenue 
share received by each country, and (3) the environmental benefits for each country. 
The last impact is of course the hardest to estimate, as still very little is known about 
the likely costs of climate changes and about how and at what costs they could be 
mitigated by adaptation measures. The direct economic burden is estimated with the 
use of general equilibrium models, which are designed to capture the many channels 
through which a carbon tax could affect a nation's production and consumption, 
including international effects such as impacts on terms of trade. Early estimates on 
such an issue are those of Whalley and Wiggle (1991a), and, in more detail, Whalley 
and Wiggle (1991b), which show that the burden on each region (three world regions 
in the first paper, six in the second) depends very much on the format of the global 
  
 24 
carbon tax and the rules for revenue redistribution. Countries that are significant net 
exporters of fossil energy (such as OPEC countries) would benefit strongly from 
harmonized taxes levied at the well, with no international redistribution of the 
revenues, because that would amount to a coordinated price increase. Symmetrically, 
net importers of fossil energy would benefit from harmonized taxes levied on 
emissions, with no international redistribution, because that would improve their 
terms of trade, like a buyers' cartel. Finally, an international tax with revenues 
redistributed to countries in proportion to their populations would greatly benefit the 
least developed ones, thanks to huge transfers from North to South. Those countries 
would suffer from the harmonized tax regimes. 
The importance of compensatory redistribution is made evident by the large 
differences in abatement costs across regions if a harmonized carbon tax is imposed, 
even if its revenues stay in each country. Figure 25.3 shows estimates of those net 
costs, taking into account general equilibrium effects such as terms-of-trade changes 
and trade flows (TOCSIN research team 2009). The simulations were performed with 
a state-of-the-art model coupling the worldwide computable general equilibrium 
model GEMINI-E3 and the bottom-up technology model TIAM after carefully 
updating them with the best available data for China and India. The costs of 
mitigation are those obtained with a harmonized tax on all greenhouse gas emissions 
that would control them so that radiative forcing never exceeds 3.5 W/m2. All 
countries are assumed to participate and to recycle their tax revenues in lump-sum 
fashion to their population. The costs of mitigation are measured in terms of GDP, 
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consumption and consumer surplus loss.16 Climate change impacts and adaptation are 
not considered. Mitigation costs are greatest for the fossil-fuel exporters Russia and 
the Middle Eastern countries, but they are also relatively high for Africa, while the 
most advanced Asian and European countries bear no net costs at all. 
 [Insert Figure 25.3 about here] 
A well-drafted global environmental tax creates surplus relative to the no-policy 
alternative, which can be used for the actual compensation of the losers. This global 
surplus is the difference between avoided environmental damage and adaptation costs 
on the one hand and mitigation costs on the other hand. However, avoided damage 
costs are a hard-to-mobilize source of transfers, particularly when they occur in the 
distant future. Many countries, particularly the least developed ones, place much 
greater weight on current mitigation costs rather than on future avoided climate 
change costs. They call for a fair sharing of mitigation costs. Figure 25.3 does not 
suggest that mitigation costs are shared fairly under a global carbon tax, whatever 
one's definition of fairness is. The kind of redistribution needed to ensure voluntary 
participation ought to make sure that no participant is worse off under the global tax 
regime, a minimal condition of fairness. 
                                                     
16 GDP loss is the sum of discounted GDP losses relative to the no-policy 
baseline until 2100. Consumption loss is the sum of discounted variations in 
household consumption. Surplus loss is the sum of discounted annual consumer 
surplus divided by the present value of household consumption in the baseline. 
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<a>COMPLIANCE 
A global environmental tax raises new compliance issues compared to the textbook 
national tax. To begin with, it might have to be enforced by developing countries that 
might lack the required institutions. Second, the global tax would be imposed without 
any superior authority that could ensure compliance, even though each country would 
have an incentive to free-ride on other countries' efforts. A country might have 
decided to participate, maybe in exchange for some compensatory transfer or other 
advantage granted by other countries, but it might still want to cheat on its 
commitments. In the case of the international tax design, it must agree to contribute to 
the global fund based on its actual emissions. In the case of the harmonized tax 
design, it must agree to tax all of its domestic sources even though it might wish to 
protect some sectors. 
Developing countries might be even further away from the textbook model of 
optimal Pigouvian taxation than are developed countries. Their markets are less 
efficient; they have greater difficulty in preventing tax evasion and making sure that 
effective and statutory tax rates coincide; and they typically lack the means to offset 
the adverse distributional consequences of environmental taxes (Blackman and 
Harrington 2000; Sandmo 2004). Nonetheless, a carbon tax is not the most difficult 
environmental tax to implement because it need not be charged on actual emissions. It 
can be levied at the border, on the imports of fossil fuels, and, if applicable, at the 
point of extraction. 
This does not address, however, the issue of the heavy burden falling on 
particularly fragile households or firms. Participating countries might want to protect 
them against the hardships of the global tax. They also might want to protect 
particularly polluting or resource-intensive sectors, especially if those sectors are 
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exposed to international competition. These are strong motives for noncompliance 
with the harmonized tax. The hidden means for such 'domestic cushioning strategies' 
(Wiener 1999, 785) are numerous: offsetting tax cuts, indirect subsidies such as free 
land rights, and so forth. In the case of carbon taxation, almost all countries apply 
other direct and indirect taxes and subsidies on fossil energy, which can be perfectly 
justified by the internalization of local external effects or revenue purposes and which 
can easily be modified by arguing that those motives changed (Hoel 1992; Hoel 
1993a). They actually do change when a carbon tax is introduced! 
Clearly, international enforcement of compliance with harmonized taxation 
would be extremely difficult and would imply deep scrutiny into domestic tax 
practices.17 The incentives for cushioning and the difficulty of detecting it are greater 
under the harmonized tax regime than under a quota regime, which would force 
countries to compensate for the exemptions granted to some sectors and which would 
not impose a burden on polluters beyond the mitigation costs (Wiener 1999, 786). On 
the other hand, a country that is lenient with its polluters under a system of 
internationally tradable quotas allows them to sell more permits for foreign cash, 
which increases the risk of corruption (Nordhaus 2006, 34). 
The international tax design faces compliance difficulties too. It requires precise 
monitoring on national emissions. For CO2, countries already contribute data to 
national emissions inventories, which is not very complicated (the algorithm is thus: 
measure the extraction of fossil fuels plus imports minus exports). Things are more 
                                                     
17 Cooper (1998) argues that the IMF could monitor enforcement of the 
harmonized tax, as it holds annual consultations with nearly all countries in the 
world on their macroeconomic policies, including their tax revenues. 
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complicated when carbon sequestration and the emissions from cement production are 
to be taken into account, and even more so when the tax is extended to other 
greenhouse gases. These issues are not different, however, for the international tax 
than for an agreement on quantities or a cap-and-trade regime. 
<a>CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
There are two main formats for a global tax: a harmonized tax, which each participant 
country imposes at the same rate on all its domestic emitters, and an international tax, 
which each participant country pays into a common fund in proportion to its total 
emissions. We have assessed global taxes and have compared the two formats with 
respect to five criteria: environmental-effectiveness, revenue-effectiveness, cost-
effectiveness, fairness and compliance. The main results are summarized in Table 
25.1. 
 [Insert Table 25.1 about here] 
Where does this leave us with respect to the likelihood of implementation? 
Clearly there are great challenges related to all criteria, but also great potential, in 
particular for generating the large revenues that developing countries will increasingly 
need in order to address the effects of climate changes. Should revenue generation 
become the main argument for a global environmental tax on which all countries can 
agree, then the international tax would be the natural design. Most likely it would be a 
small tax and it would be levied mostly on higher-income countries, or possibly on all 
countries as they pass an income-per-capita threshold. Such a tax would not do much 
for climate change mitigation. 
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If climate change mitigation remains the main purpose of the global tax, then 
harmonized national taxes would be the more natural and likely design.18 It is much 
easier for countries to agree on a set of actions, in particular harmonized carbon taxes, 
than on quantitative targets such as national emission targets (Cooper 2000). Tax 
harmonization is flexible in that it can start with a nucleus of first movers who simply 
align their internal carbon taxes at a common rate, without the need to create new 
institutions or conduct controversial negotiations about such things as emission 
quotas. New participants can join at any time by simply introducing the same carbon 
tax. This might lead the coalition to revise its climate policies and modify technology 
and financial transfer rules, in accordance with the 'bottom-up approach' of Bodansky 
et al. (2004). Complete adherence of all countries is not necessary, but the circle of 
participants ought to be extended gradually to increase environmental- and cost-
effectiveness. Dedicating part of the revenues of the harmonized carbon tax to a 
common pool that helps newcomers would accelerate adherence. 
This progressive approach can draw on the international diplomatic experience 
with the harmonization of tariffs (Nordhaus 2006).19 It is similar to the EU's 'opting 
                                                     
18 OECD (2009) sees the most promising way toward a global carbon price in 
the linking of domestic and regional emission trading schemes. This approach 
would suffer, however, from the new skepticism in global financial markets, 
which have shown that they spread shocks around the globe, and the new 
skepticism in a common currency, since emission permits would be a common 
currency. 
19 Incidentally, tariff harmonization could lead to the harmonization of 
domestic carbon taxes. Indeed, countervailing import tariffs (border tax 
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out' and 'flexible geometry' rules. EU climate policy, in particular its emissions 
trading scheme, shows that (groups of) countries are willing to take a first step to 
address climate change even when other big emitters opt out (such as the United 
States) or are allowed to not participate (developing countries). Similar unilateral first 
moves, later followed by cooperation, have been observed in other areas: trade, 
disarmament, phasing-out of ozone-depleting substances etc. (Pizer 2009). There are 
advantages for first movers in a repeated game context where there is a good chance 
that some cooperation will ultimately ensue. The first movers might be countries for 
which the balance of benefits (including internal benefits such as reduced pollution 
and terms-of-trade gains) and costs is more favorable. More research might be needed 
on such gradual implementation of a global environmental tax and the conditions for 
'coalitions of the willing' to emerge. 
The EU is probably the best place to experiment with harmonized national taxes. 
It has experience with tax harmonization, in particular value-added taxation (Padilla 
and Roca 2004). On the other hand, the EU has tried and failed in the past to agree on 
a common carbon tax. The Commission of the European Communities had put such a 
proposal to the Council in 1992, a tax starting at about US$7 per ton CO2 and rising 
gradually to US$22 (Delbeke 1994). This shows that it is easier to harmonize taxes 
that all countries already have in some form or other, which is not the case with 
                                                                                                                                                      
adjustments) require equivalent carbon taxes on domestic production under 
WTO regulation. When these import tariffs are harmonized, this leads 
automatically to harmonized domestic carbon taxes. 
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carbon taxation (Baranzini, Goldemberg and Speck 2000).20 As a result, passing 
carbon tax legislation is a first step that each country must take on its own before it 
can join the coalition. 
The harmonized tax format faces the problem of preexisting taxes on fossil fuels 
and compensating subsidies on complements. This problem is not negligible, as 
countries use a wide array of significant taxes and subsidies related to fossil fuels. The 
only practical solution seems to be to agree on some minimum tax on fossil fuels and 
let each country decide how it wants to incorporate financing motives or the 
internalization of local external effects, and how it wants to compensate the users of 
fossil fuels for the income effects. Lower carbon tax rates in developing countries can 
be defended following second-best arguments as long as large transfers from 
developed countries do not compensate them for the heavy mitigation burden imposed 
on them (Sandmo 2004). Here again, more research is warranted to find practical 
rules for differentiated harmonized taxes that replace the uniform-emissions-price 
mantra by taking into account all the subtleties of the real world. 
One interesting attempt at harmonization originates again in the European 
Union. In May 2011, the European Commission issued proposals to regulate transport 
and heating fuel taxation in the Union, not just by setting minimum rates but also by 
defining a common tax base. By these proposals, fuel taxes should be the sum of a 
component based on energy content and a component based on CO2 emissions. The 
latter would be a uniform 20 Euros per ton from 2013, close to the expected carbon 
price in the EU ETS. 
                                                     
20 The OECD maintains a database on environmentally related taxes and other 
instruments: http://www.oecd.org/env/policies/database. 
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In the meantime, there should be some agreement to gradually phase out all 
forms of harmful subsidies to fossil fuels. This could be achieved in a multilateral 
fashion, similar to the removal of barriers to trade. Non-OECD countries are the most 
concerned. The removal of these subsidies could lower greenhouse gas emissions 
from fossil fuels combustion by 30 percent relative to business-as-usual levels by 
2050 (OECD 2009). 
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